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Realism, Liberalism and Non-Ideal Theory: or, 'Are there Two Ways to 
Do Realistic Political Theory' 
 
Abstract 
The charge that contemporary political theory has lost touch with the realities of politics is common to both the 
recent ideal/non-ideal theory debate and the revival of interest in realist thought. However a tendency has arisen to 
subsume political realism within the ideal/non-ideal theory debate, or to elide realism with non-ideal theorising. 
This paper argues that this is a mistake. The ideal/non-ideal theory discussion is a methodological debate that 
takes place within the framework of liberal theory. Realism, contrary to several interpretations, is a distinct and 
competing conception of politics in its own right that stands in contrast to that of liberal theory and its ambitions. 
While the two debates are united in a sense that contemporary liberal theory needs to be more realistic, they differ 
significantly in both what this critique amounts to and, more importantly, what it is to do more realistic political 
theory. 
 
While the accusation that political theory is too detached from the real world of politics is hardly 
a new claim, it has been made repeatedly throughout the years by those more sympathetic to the 
empirical study of politics or who see themselves as men (or women) 'of action', this charge is 
now being loudly and forcefully voiced from within the sub-discipline itself. Both the ideal/non-
ideal theory debate and the recent resurgence of interest in realist political thought pursue this 
line of criticism, most often in relations specifically to the work of John Rawls and the form of 
neo-Kantian liberal theorising which he has inspired. However, though non-ideal theory and 
political realism make prima facie similar claims regarding the need for contemporary liberal 
theory to be more in touch with reality, this thematic similarity obscures a series of significant 
differences in relation to their critiques of liberalism and their suggestions as to how political 
theory can be more realistic. These differences are being lost in an increasing and unfortunate 
tendency in the literature to elide the realist critique of liberalism with the non-idealist critique of 
ideal liberal theory, and more generally, realism with non-ideal theory. Realism is often presented 
as a variation of a non-ideal theme. This conflation is a mistake. Whereas the ideal/non-ideal 
theory debate is a series of methodological issues that take place squarely within the liberal 
framework and hence retains many (if not all) of its assumptions regarding the purpose of 
politics and the ambitions of political theory, realism is a competing theory of politics in its own 
right, and, importantly, one that presents a radical challenge to those liberal assumptions. In the 
context of ongoing concerns about the relationship between political theory and political practice 
including the question of how realistic our theorising of politics needs to be, it is important that 
these significantly different accounts of what it is to do realistic political theory are highlighted 
and preserved.  
 In order to make these arguments I want to proceed in three stages. The first section will 
explicate the central features of the ideal/non-ideal theory debate, and in particular draw 
attention to its critique of contemporary liberal theory and how realism has been incorporated 
into this framework. The second section will then briefly set out the general features of the 
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realist account of politics, drawing particular attention to those aspects that lead it dismiss liberal 
theory as grounded in an inadequate conception of politics as a human activity (rather than as 
excessively fact-insensitive or impracticable as is the non-ideal charge). The final section shall 
then trace the consequences of these differences, exploring how non-ideal theory and realism 
lead to alternate accounts of what it is to do realistic political theory, including what the 
appropriate objectives of political theory should be and the nature of the constraints under 
which it must work. In doing so, it shall also highlight those areas in which non-ideal theory's 
status as a methodological debate within liberal theory leads it to replicate several assumptions of 
the liberal conception of politics that from the perspective of realist theory are thoroughly 
unrealistic and must be abandoned if we are to engage in properly realistic political theorising.i  
  
 
The Ideal/Non-Ideal Theory Debate 
Even a cursory glance at the impressive body of literature that the ideal/non-ideal theory debate 
has already generated is enough to demonstrate that there is little consensus on how to 
characterise these arguments, exactly what the shortcomings of ideal theory are taken to be, nor 
any common understanding of the nature of the relationship between the two (see Hamlin and 
Stemplowska, 2012; Valentini 2012). Nevertheless, theorists have offered two broad responses to 
the question of what ideal theory is and its perceived limitations. Some insist that ideal theories 
are those which are directed towards ‘modelling perfection’, setting out what a perfectly just 
society would look like and which provide a vision of the ideal towards which we should work 
(Estlund, 2011; Jubb, 2012; Lawford-Smith, 2010; Simmons, 2010; Swift, 2008).  ‘The aim of 
ideal theory’, as Ingrid Robeyns has put it, ‘is to work out the principles of justice that should 
govern a society, that is, to propose and justify a set of principles of justice that should be met 
before we would consider a certain society just’ (2008, p. 343). On such a view, ideal theory 
provides the blueprint for a perfectly just society, our desired endpoint towards which political 
action, reform and design should be directed. And by providing such a blueprint, it also enables 
us to make evaluative comparisons between the ideal and the non-ideal circumstances we live in 
today, allowing us to determine where injustices prevail and when at least partial justice has been 
achieved. But ideal theory tells us nothing about how we get from our circumstances of partial 
justice to those of full justice. Addressing this specifically practical and transitional question is, 
on this view the proper purview of non-ideal theory. There is no claim that ideal theory is 
deficient in any regard; rather there is simply a division of labour between the aims and 
objectives of ideal and non-ideal theories which mean that the later needs to be engaged in 
questions of the implementation of normative recommendations in practice in a way that is not 
appropriate for the former.  
Others have identified ideal theories as those that share a particular deficiency in 
common, that of impracticability (Farrelly, 2007; Miller,  2008; Stemplowska, 2008; Valentini, 
2009; Wiens, 2012). Ideal theories offer ‘no immediate or workable solutions to any of the 
problems our societies face’ (Stemplowska, 2008, p. 19) insofar as they are either inadequately 
sensitive to certain politically salient facts (about human nature, psychology, economics, etc.), 
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incorporate inappropriate idealisations (see Valentini, 2009, pp. 351-55), take place at too high a 
level of abstraction to allow it to offer anything in the way of relevant action-guiding 
recommendations in relation to the actual political problems we face, or pay little heed to the 
existence of feasibility constraints which limit how effectively normative prescriptions could be 
put into political practice. The charge is that these deficiencies in ideal theory make it at best an 
insufficient guide for political action in our non-ideal contexts, at worst an irrelevant or possibly 
even dangerous blueprint for political reform (Hendrix, 2013; Miller, 2013; Robeyns, 2008, pp. 
357-8; Valentini, 2009). The majority of those who endorse this account of ideal-theory-as-
impracticability support the former claim and hence argue that ideal theory retains an appropriate 
role in normative theorising, though it might be a much more circumscribed and focused one. 
Some of the more extreme critics of ideal theory, such as Farrelly (2007), Mills (2005), Sen (2006) 
and Wiens (2012), have argued that there is no place at all for ideal theory as it has most often 
been understood and practiced, and hence that the vast majority of work undertaken in our 
theoretical investigations into the demands of justice for instance in the past four decades has 
been fatally and seemingly irredeemably methodologically flawed. But for most, non-ideal theory 
is not a rival approach to ideal theorising, indeed it is not a distinct theory at all, but rather a set 
of concerns regarding the practicability of liberal theory in its most idealised form. Hence even 
those who see ideal theory as impracticable often believe that it remains a necessary or important 
facet of normative political theorising, though one that needs tempering with more non-ideal 
concerns. 
 For non-ideal theory, the problem with contemporary liberal theory is that its insufficient 
regard for the facts has impeded its ability to fulfil its normative ambitions of providing guidance 
for political action and reform. Greater concern for the facts, either in relation to implementing 
the recommendations of ideal theory in the real (non-ideal) world or through incorporating those 
facts into the very normative theorising itself, will produce a theory more suited to guiding action 
here and now. The more facts one incorporates the more realistic the theory will be. This link 
between fact-sensitivity, practicability and realism is made most explicitly in Laura Valentini's 
important survey piece (2012) ‘Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map’. Realism is 
presented by Valentini as a subset of non-ideal concerns about ideal theory and about utopian 
forms of ideal theory more specifically. ‘Utopian theories’, we are told, ‘argue that principles of 
justice are altogether independent of factual constraints’ (Valentini,  2012, p. 657). Realist 
theories, on the other hand, recognise that reality places certain feasibility constraints on what is 
possible when designing normative principles. As few theorists think that normative theorising 
should be fully utopian in assuming that it must remain completely indifferent to facts about our 
social world, Valentini suggests that what we really have is a spectrum of ‘more or less realistic 
theories’. When key features of political life are not taken sufficiently seriously within a theory 
then such theories are not ‘realistic enough’. The more salient facts about the real world a 
political theory incorporates, the more ‘capable it will be of effectively criticising political 
circumstances and guide action in the real world’ (Valentini, 2012, p 659). And the more realistic 
a theory it will be also. Realism is not therefore an alternative to utopianism but rather is situated 
at one end of a fact-sensitive (realistic)/fact-indifferent (utopian) spectrum ‘with no categorical 
difference between them’ (Valentini, 2012, p. 660) Theories are not realistic or utopian, but 
rather more realistic or more utopian. 
4 
 
It is important to recognise that neither liberal politics nor theory is at stake in the 
ideal/non-ideal theory debate, however conceived.ii This debate is a consciously methodological 
one (Valentini, 2012) directed exclusively towards the question of how one does liberal theory, 
and in particular how one does it in such a way that it can better fulfil its normative ambition of 
guiding political action and reform. It is not assumed to challenge, nor seek to challenge, liberal 
theory on any of its central normative or conceptual commitments. It may urge liberal theory to 
expand its scope to include non-ideal concerns regarding applying principles in practice, or to be 
more conscious of the appropriate level of abstraction and idealisation that it engages in, but it 
does not reach deeper than that to pose more fundamental questions to its theoretical 
framework itself. Non-ideal theory is (in most cases) seen explicitly as an amendment or 
corrective to ideal liberal theorising. To equate realism with non-ideal theory, to characterise it as 
a corrective to liberalism’s lack of appropriate fact-sensitivity or appreciation of feasibility 
constraints that impinge on the implementation of ideals in practice, is therefore to think of it 
also as situated in a critical but necessary relationship to ideal theory. Realism becomes a 
remedial set of considerations for ideal theory, it is not an independent and distinctive theory of 
politics, nor can it be construed as a radical or critical challenge to ideal theory or, more 
importantly for our purposes, to liberal political theory more generally. A more realistic liberal 
theory would be one that paid greater heed to the facts of our social world so as to offer better 
normative guidance for political action.   
 
Realism and the Political 
If we think about the canon of realist thinkers in political theory, which includes at least 
Thucydides, Saint Augustine, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Hume, Nietzsche, Weber, and Schmitt 
(though several of these are admittedly contested - though this is true of some figures in all 
canons), then it is not easy to see exactly how they count as realists if by realism we mean a 
concern for the implementation of ideals in practice or the need to engage in more fact-sensitive 
normative theorising. While many (though not all) of these realist theorists did indeed concern 
themselves with how we should theorise politics in light of facts and constraints imposed upon 
our political projects by the natural and social world, this does not make their theories simply 
more realistic versions of otherwise utopian theories; Hobbes is not simply a less utopian Locke. 
We recognise in their work radically different political theories, grounded in very different 
commitments and assumptions about the nature of politics. And none of them, apart from 
Hume (and possibly Hobbes under certain interpretations), can plausibly be thought of as liberal 
theorists.iii 
 What this immediately points to is that our ordinary interpretation of the realist tradition 
of political thinking is not easily characterised by an emphasis on the practicability or 
implementation of political theory in the real world. Indeed, many of these realist thinkers would 
be guilty of some of the very charges of being 'unrealistic' made by non-ideal theorists towards 
liberal theory: their theories often take place at very high levels of abstraction which at best seem 
to only indirectly address our real political issues and rarely translate into detailed plausible 
accounts of what should be done or recommendations for guiding political action in practice. 
Nor, more importantly, does this characterisation of realism capture what seems to be interesting 
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and so perennially compelling about the realist tradition. It would be difficult to see why we 
consider that tradition to represent a distinct and often radical challenge to liberal theory if all it 
were is a corrective to some of the more extreme utopianism of which such theorising can be 
prone. It is clearly more than this. Realism stands to liberalism as a fundamentally different conception of 
politics, one which has very distinct notions regarding the purpose and limits of politics, as well as the appropriate 
ambitions of political theory.  
 Disagreement and conflict is ubiquitous in social life. Such disagreements reach down to 
all areas of the human experience, including not only religious and moral matters but the most 
fundamental questions and issues of politics also. We disagree about the terms that should 
regulate our shared political association, the values and principles that should guide political 
action, and the ends towards which political power should be employed. Realists offer varying 
accounts as to why disagreement is permanent and ineradicable. Many earlier realists, like Carl 
Schmitt, Hans J. Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr, saw the sources of conflict in features of 
human nature itself, the desire for power and domination over others, or the pernicious effects 
of prejudice, egoism, passion, and pride (Morgenthau, 1946; Morgenthau, 1967; Niebuhr, 2005; 
Niebuhr, 2011; Schmitt, 1996). Despite several declaration of the need for a more realistic 
account of human psychology (Galston, 2010), this work has still to be undertaken and certainly 
contemporary realists have so far tended to shy away from such seemingly controversial 
anthropological or psychological explanations, preferring to see the sources of conflict in meta-
ethical or epistemological features of the human experience (though these are hardly 
uncontroversial). So several theorists have arrived at the centrality of conflict via the plural and 
incommensurable nature of human values (Gray, 2000; McCabe, 2010), the relational yet 
exclusionary nature of social identities which necessarily engender resistance and struggle (Honig, 
1993; Mouffe, 2005), or the inherent epistemic limitations of human rationality which lead 
people to different and conflicting moral and political positions even when using their reason in 
a sincere and genuine manner (Geuss, 2008; Waldron, 1999).  
 Despite these varying accounts of the origins of this conflict, realists agree that the 
prevalence of disagreement gives the political a particularly agonistic character. Politics takes 
place in conditions of ineradicable conflict and is hence a site of perpetual struggle for power 
and dominance. Yet politics is also the activity through which such struggles are contained in a 
manner that prevents them from descending into war by providing the mechanisms and 
procedures through which political settlements can be reached. Chief amongst these is the 
provision of authoritative order that settles by law what cannot be settled by reason or morality. 
Appeals to morality will be unable to resolve the questions of politics for the very reason that 
many of our moral disagreements, especially our conflicting notions of what values or ends 
should be pursued both individually and collectively, are part of the context of conflict and 
struggle which politics responds to. We disagree about morality; in part that is why we need 
politics. Likewise the appeal to reason is deeply problematic both because reason is taken to 
significantly underdetermine moral and political questions and hence cannot authoritatively settle 
disputes (either it is unable to offer anything other than very local solutions to the 
incommensurability of values or the epistemic limitations of human reason ensure that persons 
can reach differing yet nevertheless still rational normative positions), but also because rationality 
only provides a partial account of the motivations and reasons that move humans to action. 
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Confidence in the capacity of practical reason to significantly restrain self-interest and direct us 
towards common goals seems misplaced in light of the limited motivational powers of reason, 
and seems to exclude completely the important role of the passions and emotions (anger, love, 
hatred, loyalty, the desire to dominate others, etc.) which always have the potential to disrupt any 
settlement or order. Any attempt to settle political questions by replacing or tempering such 
emotions with reason, or by ignoring them completely, is likely to fail precisely because politics is 
not a realm dominated by reason or populated by fully rational actors. The institution of a 
political authority that can provide commonly binding decisions through law, with the legitimate 
right to employ coercion to ensure obedience with those decisions where necessary, is thus of 
paramount concern. 
 The provision of a form of political authority addresses what Bernard Williams called the 
'first political question' of securing 'order, protection, safety, trust and the conditions of 
cooperation' (2005, p. 3). This does not mean that just any response will be a sufficient answer to 
the first political question. While the political is indeed a sphere of conflict and the struggle for 
power, politics is not merely a realm of unmediated brute coercion. One of the central truths of 
politics is that there is a difference between the ability to rule and the right to do so, that might 
does not equal right, that politics is not the same as successful domination. Any claim to be 
ruling politically will need to make some appeal to the principled grounds on which such rule is 
exercised, principles that should be intelligible to both the rulers and ruled such that it can be 
recognised as a form of politics rather than simply domination (Philp, 2010, p. 471; Philp, 2007, 
p. 56; Sleat, 2013, ch. 5; Williams, 2005, p. 5-6, 23, 135-6). This is the truth in Hume's remark 
(1994, p.16) that it is 'on opinion only that government is founded'; while governments will need 
to employ force in order to rule, it cannot rule through force alone. Power does not self-justify 
and hence any form of rule that is properly speaking political must be appropriately legitimated.  
  The processes of bringing order to conflict through authoritative rule realism insists are 
part of what makes the political a distinct sphere of human activity, one which addresses its own 
unique set of concerns regarding the first political question and through the employment of a 
distinctive set of means (e.g. power, legitimation, authority). While this can often be somewhat 
overstated as demonstrating the 'autonomy of the political' from all other domains, morality, 
economics, law, etc., such that politics has its own completely unique internal logic (see 
Scheuerman, 2013), the claim is better stated that there must be some space within a theoretical 
account of politics that can recognise the distinctiveness of the political sphere, that it does have 
its own character, purposes and means, while also acknowledging that it sits in a series of 
complex relationships with other human activities. What realism rejects is any understanding of 
politics in which the distinctiveness of politics is overlooked. Most often this has been expressed 
in terms of avoiding forms of political moralism that give 'priority of the moral over the political' 
(2005, p.2). By this Williams meant that moralist theories, of which he took utilitarianism and the 
work of John Rawls to be exemplars, either make politics 'the instrument of the moral' in which 
its role is to enact principles, concepts and ideals formulated by political theory in practice, or 
places moral constraints upon what politics can rightfully do (2005, p. 1-2). In either case 
morality has antecedent authority over the content and limits of politics. Raymond Geuss makes 
a similar complaint about what he calls 'politics as "applied ethics"', by which he means a 'specific 
view about the nature and structure of ethical judgement and its relation to politics, and in 
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particular a theory about where one should start in studying politics, what the final framework for 
studying politics is, what it is reasonable to focus on, and what is possible to abstract from' 
(2008, p. 6). In particular Geuss objects to the notion that theorists should begin by completing 
the ethical work of discovering the 'ideal theory' that tells us how we should act, and then seek to 
apply that theory to the action of political agents (2008, p. 8). Realism need not reject that 
politics has any relationship with morality or moral concerns, but what it must disavow is the 
notion that politics can be fully understood in terms of moral first principles (and, indeed, the 
full complexity of the relationship between politics and morality cannot be appreciated if the 
distinctiveness of the political is not acknowledged). An appropriately political theory must be 
sensitive to the concerns, content and materials of politics itself.  
 Though brief, even this quick survey allows us to identify several general features of a 
realist conception of politics. It assume that politics cannot be reduced to any other sphere of 
human activity, nor that any other sphere has antecedent authority over the political, especially 
not morality though it is also deeply sceptical about the limited role of reason in politics. 
Disagreement and conflict, including about politics itself, are constitutive of the political insofar 
as they provide the ineradicable circumstances in which the need for politics and its unique 
concerns regarding stability and authoritative order arise. That such disagreement is permanent 
ensures that power and the ability to coercively impose the will of one group (the rulers) on 
others (the ruled) where required is a necessary component of politics also, indeed the first 
question that politics must address. But politics cannot just be imposition through coercion. 
Hence legitimacy becomes a, if not the, central political concept because it ensures that politics is 
not merely a relationship of brute domination but represents an activity that generates order and 
stability though the provision of authoritative and commonly binding decisions in conditions of 
disagreement.  
 Realism is not necessarily antithetical or hostile to liberal politics. There is nothing in the 
realist conception of politics which must inevitably lead to the rejection of liberal institutions, 
practices or values. Indeed, several realists have tried to recast liberalism in realist terms as a 
particular response to the problem of securing order and stability in conditions of conflict. 
Though not necessarily a realist herself (see Forrester, 2012), Judith Shklar's 'liberalism of fear' 
(1998) has been particularly influential in this regard, not least on the work of Bernard Williams 
(2005). Others have attempted to develop modus vivendi liberalisms in which liberal political 
frameworks are understood as compromises reached between persons with radically different 
political ideals (Gray, 2000; Horton, 2010; McCabe, 2010), or theories of 'liberal realism' (Sleat, 
2013) in which liberalism is reconceived as a hegemonic project conscious of its deeply contested 
and political nature and its relationships of domination over those that reject fundamental liberal 
vales. It is true that there are some realists who do reject liberal politics; here Chantal Mouffe's 
Schmittian theory of agonistic democracy is particularly illuminating (Mouffe, 2005), as is 
Raymond Geuss' more critical realism (though his own political position is more ambiguous). 
But nevertheless, most recent work on political realism has not sought to undermine liberal 
politics via its critique of liberal theory.  
 Yet what realism must necessarily reject are those theories of liberal politics that share at 
least one of two features, both of which are purported to be present in the neo-Kantian 
liberalism exemplified by Rawls and his followers. The first of these is an assumption that the 
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function of politics is to resolve conflict, to 'meet the urgent political requirement to fix, once 
and for all, the content of certain political basic rights and liberties, and to assign them special 
priority. Doing this takes those guarantees off the political agenda' (Rawls, 1996, p. 161). Such 
resolution has often been sought by discovering those principles or constitutional essentials that 
are acceptable to all those subject to them (Rawls, 1996, p. 137). Political activity, properly 
speaking, hence takes place within the confines of or with reference to principles and values that 
are or can be represented as the subject of universal agreement. Such a harmonious view of the 
nature of politics fails to take seriously the extent to which disagreement and conflict, including 
about the fundamental terms of our political association, are ineradicable features of political life 
in the context of which political action must still take place. This is why several realists have 
charged liberalism as failing to have a theory of politics at all, rather by focusing on agreement 
and consensus it seeks to 'displace' (Honig, 1993), 'repudiate' (Morgenthau, 1946, p. 75) or 
'abolish' (Gray, 1995, p. 76) politics, or provide an account in which the disagreements and 
conflict that politics responds to have been resolved once and for all (Newey, 2001). In assuming 
the possibility of an actual or hypothetical consensus on political principles and values, which 
allows all persons to live according to laws that they are in some important sense the authors of, 
liberal political theory is simply not a theory of politics at all (for this general critique see also 
Schmitt, 1996; Sleat, 2011; Stears 2007). The second feature of a liberal conception of politics 
(indeed any conception of politics) that realism must necessarily reject is the attempt to make the 
moral prior to the political by insisting that its content (the ends to which it should be directed) 
and/or limits (which political actions are permissible) are given by a set of pre-political moral 
values and principles, e.g. rights, autonomy, freedom, etc., that are taken to have antecedent 
authority over it. While realism certainly does not refute that morality plays any role in political 
life (for clearly it does), to reduce politics to 'applied ethics', or to circumscribe rightful political 
action through morality is to miss the extent with which politics is a distinct sphere of human 
activity with its own character and nature that while related to morality is neither reducible to it, 
nor are its content and limits exhausted by the demands that morality might make of it.  
 From the perspective of the realist conception of politics, liberal theory fails to be 
sufficiently political: either it does not adequately recognising the extent to which politics is an 
autonomous human activity or it overlooks the extent to which politics is characterised by 
political disagreement and conflict rather than harmony and consensus. The essential claim is not 
that liberalism is too ideal - lacking a sufficient regards for the facts such that its normative 
recommendations cannot be put into practice - but that it fails to properly comprehend the real 
or proper nature of politics. Realism's disagreements with liberalism are therefore best 
understood as conceptual rather than methodological. They turn on their alternative accounts of 
the nature, content and limits of politics. They are not methodological differences that take place 
within a shared (liberal) account of the political. They stand as rival accounts of the political. This 
means that realism cannot be synonymous with non-ideal theory because that, as we have seen, 
is a set of concerns that are situated within liberal theory. Nor can realism be properly or fully 
understood as a corrective to the excesses of ideal theorising, for again realism is a distinct 
conception of politics in its own right. While it might challenge liberal theory (as we shall explore 
in more detail in the following section), it does so from an external perspective of a distinct rival 
conception of politics and not as a part of some imminent critique internal to liberal theory itself. 
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Doing Realistic Political Theory 
We should expect that if realism and non-ideal theory are not synonymous that though they 
might proclaim the need for theorists to be more realistic they nevertheless have very different 
notions of what it is to do more realistic political theorising, the objectives that a more realistic 
theory should pursue and the constrains under which it must work. For non-ideal theory, the 
problem with contemporary liberal theory is that its insufficient regard for the facts has impeded 
its ability to fulfil its normative ambition of providing guidance for political action and reform. 
Greater concern for the facts, either in relation to implementing the recommendations of ideal 
theory in the real (non-ideal) world or through incorporating those facts into normative 
theorising itself, will produce a theory more suited to guiding action here and now. The more 
salient facts one incorporates, the more realistic the theory will be. Realist thought, on the other 
hand, believes that much contemporary liberal theory has assumed a flawed conception of the 
political, one in which the conflict that is constitutive of the political is overcome through 
appealing either to moral values that have antecedent over politics or through the use of reason 
to identify principles of co-existence that all persons should rationally endorse. A more realistic 
theory accepts the fact that conflict is ubiquitous in human life, that it can never be permanently 
overcome though it is the role of politics to provide an authoritative order that prevents such 
conflict from descending into chaos and anarchy. And while morality is clearly related to politics 
(as are other activities such as law and economics), it is neither reducible to it nor are its aims and 
objectives exhausted by moral demands. 
 If non-ideal theory and realism are so clearly distinct, how (we might ask) are we to 
account for the tendency to elide them? Why have non-ideal theorists thought they were doing 
realistic political theory, or that realism is a form of non-ideal theory? There are probably two 
answers to this. The first is that there is undoubtedly something intuitive about the idea that a 
theory which seeks to closer align the worlds of political theorising and political practice deserves 
the name realism. And realism is a natural term to oppose either the utopianism or idealism of 
which contemporary liberal theory is often accused. Yet while there is clearly a sense in which 
realism makes a claim to being in touch with the realities of political experience, this is not 
through a greater sensitivity to the facts but through commitment to a different conception of 
politics. The second answer, and probably the more important, likely relies on a mistaken notion 
that a theory is realistic if it appropriately attends to those facts which separate our non-ideal 
social world from the ideal. If this is the case then a non-ideal theorist might argue that conflict is 
one of the facts of our social world that falls short of the ideal (in which such conflict is absent) 
and which any full or adequate normative political theory must therefore incorporate.iv The 
central claim of realist thought regarding the permanence of conflict therefore becomes merely 
one more fact that a non-ideal theory needs to take seriously in order to prescribe more action-
guiding normative recommendations.  
 While it is true that conflict is a fact of the social world that political theory needs to take 
more seriously, acknowledging this within the context of the ideal/non-ideal theory debate and 
the general liberal conception of politics that it presumes is not enough to make the theory 
consistent with realist thought. This account assumes that our non-ideal world falls short of the 
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ideal by lacking certain features, the absence of conflict being chief among them. Yet the 
circumstances of disagreement and conflict in which the need for political activity arises and in 
which it takes place are constitutive of politics itself, and hence such circumstances cannot fall 
short of any political ideal. Some may see those circumstances as regrettable from a moral 
perspective (depending on how we account for the origins of conflict), but they cannot strictly 
speaking be seen as politically non-ideal insofar as they are necessary preconditions of politics 
itself. Put differently, the ideal from which our non-ideal world deviates cannot be a context in 
which conflict is conspicuously absent, and to theorise for such a context would be not to 
engage in political theorising at all. It may be (as realists suspect) that the objective of ideal liberal 
theory is indeed to put an end to politics, and hence some might be satisfied with the position 
that politics would not feature in an ideal world. But insofar as realism takes conflict to be a 
ubiquitous aspect of the human experience, politics is going to be permanent also. So this 
account of how non-ideal theory might incorporate the fact of conflict, and in that manner be 
realistic, still relies upon a conception of politics that realism steadfastly rejects. It is not enough 
for a theory to simply accept the fact of conflict in politics in order to count as realist. It must 
recognise that such conflict is a constitutive element of politics which, once acknowledged, 
undermines the conception of politics that the ideal/non-ideal theory debate assumes.  
 Relatedly, realism is going to insist that any political theory which does not appreciate the 
constitutive nature of conflict in politics and which takes as its main objective to overcome such 
discord is never going to provide the sort of practicable normative guidance for political actions 
that it hankers after, regardless of how many salient facts it incorporates. Paying greater attention 
to 'the facts' effectively misdiagnoses the problem of contemporary ideal liberal theory. If the 
attempt to be more fact-sensitive is undertaken within the context of the liberal conception of 
politics, then realists suspect any normative recommendations it makes will likely still be 
unsuccessful guides to action insofar as it misunderstands what politics is, the context 
(opportunities and limitations) under which political decisions are made, and the conditions that 
determine the success or failure of political actions. The issue is not that such theories will lack 
factual information relevant to implementing a theory in practice, information that if supplied 
will make such a theory better action-guiding, but that the theory fails to understand the complex 
nature of the context of power, struggle, interests and values for which the theory is intended to 
apply such that further information is unlikely to help augment its potential for successfully 
guiding political action. It fundamentally misunderstands the political sphere, the problems that it 
addresses, and the material with which it must work. This is not a question of failing to 
incorporate enough facts into the normative theory (as Valentini's account of realism suggested), 
but of failing to properly comprehend the nature of the political.  
 It is the gap that exists in contemporary liberal thought between the ideal in which 
conflict is abstracted away and the actual in which conflict is present that (alongside other 
conditions) generates the specific concerns of non-ideal theory. Such a gap cannot arise in realist 
thought. Yet issues of practicability still feature in realism, though they do so for reasons other 
than the deviation of the real from the ideal, and they relate to a different set of problems from 
those in non-ideal theory (which ensures that realism and non-ideal theory will focus on different 
research agendas). Central amongst these are concerns regarding how political rule operates 
where it is a fundamental aim of politics to establish and maintain political (that is to say 
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legitimate) authority in conditions of discord and when the obedience of those over whom 
authority is claimed and power exercised is not to be assumed as inevitable. The complex 
manner in which patterns of authority and legitimacy are forged, sustained and reconstituted, and 
in particular the related but not necessarily harmonious roles that coercion, agency, principles, 
norms and values play in these processes, ensures that questions of practicability do not arise 
once we turn to the possibility of instantiating ideals in practice but are rather raised as soon as 
we start to consider how the first political question might be answered and continue to be 
answered (which always has to be a question raised in relation to a specific context). How one 
employs the monopoly of legitimate violence in conditions where law cannot be represented as 
reflecting the will of all; what the practical and moral limits of that force may be; the ways in 
which institutions and practices actually affect people's behaviour and actions; how the 
mechanisms and processes of legitimation function, including the importance of non-rational 
features such as charisma, myth and history; which normative principles might plausibly be 
appealed to that can be recognised as authorising political rule by those subject to it;  what 
minimum level of competency can be tolerated in terms of the ordering of conflict; and which 
conflicts and differences can and cannot be settled at any one time, and which groups or 
individuals must be satisfied that such conflicts are settled, all become deeply important issues 
related to the first political question of creating order and subordinating conflict. Ideal/non-ideal 
theory assumes that such issues only arise in world that deviate from the ideal, or are secondary 
questions that we encounter only once we ask how we are to implement ideals in practice. By 
virtue of their relation to the first political question, realism takes them to be issues inherent in 
politics itself, and hence necessarily basic to any properly political theory.   
 Even in those cases where non-ideal theory and realism do focus on similar questions of 
practicability, their differences ensure that they will have diverging views as to what counts as an 
appropriate response to these issues. The theorising of legitimacy is a case in point. In the 
Kantian strand of contemporary liberalism 'the task of discovering the conditions of legitimacy is 
traditionally conceived as that of finding a way to justify a political system to everyone who is 
required to live under it ... the search for legitimacy is a search for unanimity' (Nagel, 1991, p.33). 
Likewise, Waldron wrote that ‘a social and political order is illegitimate unless it is rooted in the 
consent of all those who have to live under it; the consent or agreement of these people is a 
condition of its being morally permissible to enforce that order against them’ (1987, p. 140).v But 
liberals have always been realistic enough (in the non-utopian sense) to acknowledge that actual 
unanimity is a highly unlikely if not impossible prospect in human life, at least not without 
exercising the sort of relentless and overwhelming oppressive power that represents a major 
threat to individual liberty. So the conditions of legitimacy are amended (or their practical 
demands relaxed) in such a way that they become realisable in non-ideal conditions of 
disagreement and conflict though realise the same normative requirements of representing 
unanimity. Very broadly, that a conception can be represented as something that all persons could 
accept, even if they currently do not, or as Kant put it, ‘even if the people is at present in such a 
position or attitude of mind that it would probably refuse its consent if it were consulted’ (1999, 
p.79), is sufficient for the purposes of legitimacy (see Rawls, 1999, p. 12).vi A central challenge of 
contemporary liberal thought has been to show which political institutions, practices or 
principles, if any, can be represented as the focus of such a hypothetical consensus.  
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 It is the strategy of 'relax[ing] the exorbitant demands of unanimity', as Manin put it 
(1987, p. 340), that is important to us here, for it is a clear instance in which the ideal normative 
requirements of legitimacy, i.e. actual unanimity, have been amended in light of factual 
constraints of the (non-ideal) real world, in this case the unlikely prospect of any order enjoying 
the consent of all those over whom it rules.vii Such a strategy is understandable in light of the 
fundamental liberal commitment to respecting all individuals as free and equal, hence political 
power must arise from and represent the will of all (see Manin, 1987, p. 340-1). It is not a 
commitment that liberal theory could therefore simply abandon in response to criticisms that 
actual political unanimity is deeply unrealistic or overly utopian, for if that were true and there is 
nothing more that can be said, then it would say something important yet deeply depressing 
about the possibility of freedom and equality in modernity. 
 As we have seen, the demand for legitimacy arises within realist thought as inherent in 
any claim to rule politically rather than through brute coercion. For reasons that are hopefully 
now clear, realism would reject universal consent as a condition of political legitimacy as it would 
be a contradiction to say that only political orders that are unanimously endorsed or endorsable 
are legitimate for, even if that were a realistic possibility, they would not be political orders at all. 
Unanimity cannot even be an ideal requirement of political legitimacy not because it is utopian to 
think that such consensus is possible in our non-ideal world but because unanimity is a denial of 
the conditions in which the need for politics arises and in which political activity takes place. As 
such the appropriate response to the question of legitimating power despite ongoing existent 
disagreement is not to try and find theoretical means of representing political orders as 
representing the will of all, but to deny that unanimity, actual or hypothetical, is a condition of 
legitimacy at all. The legitimation of power must take place in ongoing conditions of conflict, 
including of disagreement that the political order is legitimate at all, and amongst the very 
relationships of power, rule and coercion that require legitimation. Exactly what the legitimation 
of a political order requires is a matter of disagreement amongst realists, and there are several 
avenues currently being explored (see, for example, Beetham, 1991; Horton, 2012; Horton, 2010; 
Mason, 2010; Mouffe, 2005; Newey, 2010; Philp, 2012; Sleat, 2012; Rossi, 2012; Rossi, 2010; 
Waldron, 1999; Williams, 2005), including whether the commitment to freedom and equality that 
underpins the liberal principle of legitimacy can be realised within a realist conception of politics 
that rejects the possibility of unanimity (Sleat, 2013). In many ways, and given the significance of 
legitimacy to much realist thought, the question of whether a coherent and plausible account of 
realist legitimacy can be developed is likely to be crucial in determining whether realism 
represents a viable alternative form of political theorising in its own right. But what is crucial for 
our purposes is the fact that a realist account of legitimacy cannot simply amend the condition of 
unanimity but must reject that political legitimation demands universal consent at all 
(hypothetical or actual). Hence the manner in which we theorise legitimacy, and what would 
constitute an appropriate theory of how power is legitimated, differs in realism and non-ideal 
theory as a direct result of their competing accounts of politics. 
 
Conclusion 
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The subtitle of this paper asks whether there are two ways to do realistic political theory. In part 
this question was posed because of the increasing tendency to assume that the recent debates 
surrounding political realism and non-ideal theory are effectively synonymous insofar as they are 
united in their general critique of contemporary liberal theory as out of touch with reality. I hope 
to have shown that this is not the case and that they actually represent two very different 
analyses and evaluations of what is problematic in much recent liberal thought. But this then 
poses the question as to whether non-ideal theory qualifies as a distinct but related form of 
realist thought. Though very little ever really hangs on the question of what name one uses to 
describe a theory (though it often plays an important rhetorical function - 'realist' political theory 
being a case in point), what I have sought to do here is demonstrate that non-ideal theory 
remains tied to a conception of politics that stands in stark contrast to the realist understanding 
of the political and which relies upon a set of assumptions about the ambitions of politics and 
political theory that realism rejects. And insofar as that is true, they also point to two different 
and competing ways of rescuing contemporary political theory from its unrealistic shortcomings.  
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i It is worth noting from the outset that it is not within the remit of this paper to examine the validity of either non-
ideal theory or political realism's critiques of liberal theory, or, maybe more interestingly, to assess their 
characterisations of liberal theory. Very significant questions have been raised (and still require further exploration) 
as to how far both correctly characterise the nature and objectives of contemporary liberal theory, and specifically in 
relation to realism the extent to which it focuses too much of its critical attention on a very specific and in many 
ways non-typical neo-Kantian form of liberalism at the expense of other liberal theories which might not be liable to 
the same alleged shortcomings and difficulties. These are important issues that are being investigated elsewhere, but 
not ones immediately relevant to the focus of this paper. 
ii The only exception to this that I am aware of is Mills (2005) for whom ideal liberal theory is a form of ideology 
that masks the true inequalities and injustices within society.  
iii For two excellent interpretations of Hume as both a realist and a liberal see Sabl (2012) and Whelen (2004) 
iv Something like this can be found in the manner in which Rawls thought about the division of labour in political 
theory: the aim of the 'ideal' part is to define a standard of social interaction (justice) for conditions that are 
favourable to coexisting on just terms. These conditions he assumed include strict compliance where everybody 
knows, endorses and abides by the same principles of justice. The second, 'non-ideal', part, which we turn to after 
we have completed the inquiries of ideal theory, attends to those questions that arise when those conditions are not 
present, which includes conditions of non-compliance where persons might as a matter of fact reject the regulative 
conception of justice or, for whatever reason, fail to be adequately motivated to obey its demands (Rawls, 1999, p. 
216). 
v For other statements of this liberal account of legitimacy see Hampton, 1998, p. 180; Manin, 1987; Rawls, 1996, p. 
224; Rawls, 2007, p. 13. 
vi Bernard Manin (1987) has explored the alternative, but potentially related, strategy pursued by Sieyès and 
Rousseau in light of the difficulty of reconciling the requirement of unanimity with the practical necessities of 
political life of demonstrating how a majority of actual consent can be considered as equivalent as universal 
agreement. 
vii Though A. John Simmons (1999) has argued that if Rawls really was motivated by an ideal of a fully voluntary 
society then rather than adopting a form of 'quasi-voluntariness' in the face of the facts of political life he should 
have been 'interested in restructuring political societies so as to make the choice of membership (or 
nonmembership) as voluntary at least as circumstances would permit' (p. 761).  
